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Abstract This study investigates the financial performance of Dutch companies
both with and without women on their boards. The analysis extends earlier methods
used in research by Catalyst (The bottom line: corporate performance and women’s
representation on boards, 2007) and McKinsey (Women matter. Gender diversity, a
corporate performance driver. McKinsey & Company, USA, 2007), two studies that
are often cited in the literature, although, each has a number of methodological
shortcomings. This article adds to the international debate, which is often norma-
tive, through examining 99 listed companies in the Dutch Female Board Index. Our
results show that firms with women directors perform better than those without
women on their boards.
Keywords Governance  Gender diversity  Board composition  Performance 
Resource dependence theory
1 Introduction
The subject of women on boards of directors is a growing area of research. Scholars
(e.g. Adams and Ferreira 2004; Burgess and Tharenou 2002; Van Ees et al. 2007;
Sealy et al. 2007), professionals (e.g. McKinsey 2007) and societal pressure groups
(e.g. Catalyst 2007) contribute to research on the subject indicating that the
representation of women in the boardroom should be higher, and fewer all-male
boards should occur for several reasons. Some authors (Brammer et al. 2007) look at
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the connection between the presence of women at the top and (good) corporate
governance: a homogeneous group of directors does not accurately reflect the
society in which it operates, and is both a symptom of weak corporate governance
and a missed opportunity.
The present article investigates whether or not companies with female directors
perform better than companies with no female directors. Firstly, an outline is given
of the arguments in favor of diversity from both the economic and the moral
perspective, and the hypothesis of the relationship with company performance. The
focus then turns to the research by Catalyst (2007) and McKinsey (2007) into
the relationship between diversity and the financial performance of a company. The
media and opinion makers often refer to these reports, despite their (statistical)
shortcomings. This study reflects on and improves the methods of Catalyst (2007)
and McKinsey (2007), and in doing so contributes to the discussion.
The empirical investigation in this study uses Dutch data. Companies in the
Netherlands use a two-tier board model: the executive board and the supervisory
board are two separately functioning boards. Internationally the one-tier model is
more usual; the executive and non-executive directors are together within one board
of directors). To avoid confusion, this study adopts the international terminology,
and refers to the executive board and supervisory board together as the ‘‘board’’.
In The Netherlands the proportion of women on corporate boards is still very
low. The Dutch Female Board Index 2007 shows for the first time in the Netherlands
which Dutch listed companies had a woman in one of these two board-tiers; this
index ranks firms according to the percentage of women on the board (Lu¨ckerath-
Rovers 2008). At the end of 2007, 5% of all executive and non-executive directors
in Dutch companies were female; this proportion was the weighted average of 2.1%
female executive directors and 6.9% female non-executive directors. The absence of
women on boards of directors and supervisory boards resulted in a motion put to the
Lower House of the Dutch Parliament (Parliamentary Paper 31083, p. 17) to include
a target for the proportion of women on the supervisory board in the Dutch
Corporate Governance Code. Although, the Corporate Governance Monitoring
Committee (Frijns Committee) acknowledged the importance of diversity, it did not
include any targets in its recommendations of December 2008. The Committee
proposed that the Dutch Corporate Governance Code should include the objective
that a company must ‘‘aim for a diverse composition in terms of such factors as
gender and age’’ and that each company should establish its own target. The new
Dutch Corporate Governance Code from January 2009 includes this objective. A
comparison with four other European Corporate Governance Codes (Lu¨ckerath-
Rovers 2010) showed that France, Germany and the UK also do not include
demographic characteristics of directors (including gender) in their corporate
governance codes. In Spain, however, both a law is installed that obliges companies
to adopt a more balanced composition of the board as the corporate governance
code especially addresses the issue. The Spanish law indicates that ‘‘balanced’’
means that each sex should account for at least 40% of the board. The law provides
for preferential treatment in the awarding of public contracts for companies that
reach this target. The penalty in Spain seems less severe than in Norway
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(in Norway, a company can be closed down as a last resort), but it certainly has a
compelling character.
2 Diversity and corporate governance
Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) describe diversity in the context of corporate
governance as the composition of the board and the combination of the different
qualities, characteristics and expertise of the individual members in relation to
decision-making and other processes within the board. The gender of the board
members is therefore only one of the characteristics of diversity. However, this
article focuses only on gender forseveral reasons. Firstly, the (normative) debate
focuses on gender in the boardroom resulting in quota-legislation in several
countries (Norway, Spain, France and the Netherlands). Secondly, gender is the
most easy distinguished demographic characteristic compared with age, nationality,
education or cultural background, for example. Finally, our study aims to improve
the methodology of the popular studies of McKinsey’s (2007) and Catalyst’s (2007)
popular studies which also focus on gender.
Whether the presence of women on the board improves the governance of a
company is linked to the question of what good corporate governance should
achieve. For example, Brown et al. (2002) argue that if good corporate governance
does not result in improved performance, then the question of who sits on the board
of the company or how that board operates has no practical value, and appointing
women to the board then has merely symbolic value. Research into the presence of
women on the board is directly connected with other aspects of corporate
governance. These include the importance of a good relationship with stakeholders,
as proposed by both stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Davis 1991) and resource
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik (1978); diversity as a measure of
independence as advocated in agency theory [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]; and
diversity as a necessity for fair and transparent decision-making Luoma and
Goodstein (1999). Huse (2007) found that in Norway, where 40% of all directors are
required by law to be female, the gender debate has contributed more to the
evaluation of the role and position of the board than any other recent discussion,
including shareholder activism or the development of best practices.
Resource dependence theory regards corporate boards as an essential link
between the company and its environment and the external resources on which a
company depends. This link is necessary for good corporate performance. Using the
board of directors as a linkage mechanism with stakeholders provides companies
with at least four benefits (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, p. 145): firstly, linkage may
provide the organisation with useful information, secondly, linkage provides a
channel for communication purposes, thirdly, linkage is an important step in
obtaining commitments of support from important elements of the environment and
fourthly, linkage has a value in legitimizing organisations. Hillman et al. (2007)
investigated organizational characteristics to determine which of these affect the
likelihood of women being appointed. Using resource dependency theory as a basis,
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they investigated how boards of directors serve as a linkage instrument and under
which organizational characteristics gender diversity is most valuable.
By recruiting female directors, companies may provide these benefits from
linking with their stakeholders. However, providing legitimacy is especially
mentioned in literature on gender diversity in the boardroom. Female directors on
boards can provide a valuable form of legitimacy in the eyes of potential and current
employees, and women directors also symbolise career possibilities to prospective
recruits (Hillman et al. 2007; Singh and Vinnicombe 2004). A board of directors
provides legitimacy with regard to several groups of stakeholders. As discussed by
Brammer et al. (2007), greater equality of representation relates to direct and
indirect benefits that may potentially arise from more closely reflecting the
demographic characteristics of key stakeholder groups such as customers, employ-
ees and investors. Furthermore, customer-oriented businesses are more inclined to
appoint female directors to their board, as such appointments give these businesses
legitimacy with regard to their customers and enhances relations with customer
stakeholders (Brammer et al. 2007). Also, such businesses show that ‘they are
responding to calls for increased diversity for better governance and better use of
available talent’ (Singh 2007, p. 2131). This might enhance their reputation and
consequently their performance. Hillman et al. (2007) add that legitimacy and
conformity to societal expectations are considered key components of organisa-
tional survival.
Adams and Ferreira (2004, p. 14) suggest that gender diversity on boards may
have a political dimension. ‘Companies may care more about diversity when they
are concerned about their public image, either because they are large firms which
are visible to outsiders or because they are required to deal with government
agencies which have preferences for diversity’. Large organisations are more likely
to be a visible target for the demands of others in the social context and thus need to
establish linking in the social context (Hillman et al. 2007, p. 944; Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978, p.168) Indeed company size is one of the most consistent predictors
of a company having female directors, according to Burgess and Tharenou (2002).
Can demographic characteristics of directors actually have so much impact on
the organization that its performance improves? Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996)
suggest two reasons why the composition of the board might affect the performance
of a firm. Firstly, the board has the most influence on a company’s strategic
decision-making. Secondly, the board also has a supervisory role, in that it
represents the shareholders, must respond appropriately to takeover threats, and
monitors the total value of the company. Given that individual board members
jointly determine decision-making within the board, the composition of the board
can affect the performance of a company. However, when researching the effect of
the composition of the board, several complicating factors may arise. These
complicating factors include firstly, how to measure diversity over time, secondly,
causality between diversity and performance, and thirdly, critical mass theory. In
the next section, which addresses previous research on the relationship between
gender diversity and firm performance, we will further elaborate on these issues.
Recent literature suggests various arguments as to why the greater representation
of women on boards results in better decision-making within the boardroom.
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The presence of women might improve team performance, because more diverse
teams may consider a greater range of perspectives and therefore reach better
decisions. These better decisions then ultimately could lead to higher business value
and business performance (Burgess and Tharenou 2002; Singh and Vinnicombe
2004; Carter et al. 2003). Failure to choose the most suitable candidate affects
company performance and the absence of women might be suboptimal for the firm.
Brammer et al. (2007) argue that, if we assume that certain valuable qualities are not
evenly distributed among demographic groups (men and women), the company is
structurally denying these qualities by excluding women from decision-making
positions. Companies with a higher degree of diversity on the board also give an
important positive signal to (potential) employees of that company. The competitive
situation both inside and outside the company (between existing and potential
employees) is strengthened (Rose 2007), and performance should improve (Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978). Society also regards a higher degree of diversity as positive,
and the reputation of the company improves. When the diversity within the
company and its management reflects the diversity within the relevant market, a
company is better able to serve and retain that market (Carter et al. 2003; Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978; Donaldson and Davis 1991).
Diversity might also contribute to the discussion, exchange of ideas and
performance of the group (Kang et al. 2007). On the other hand, however, taking
into account a wider range of more perspectives can also be more time-consuming
and result in more conflicts. Weighing up more perspectives can delay decision-
making and may eventually make the board more divided than a less heterogeneous
board would be (Rose 2007). Such behavior has been observed among diverse top
management teams which can be more expensive and difficult to coordinate than
homogeneous teams, and where the increased costs from lack of coordination can
neutralise the increase in financial performance (Dwyer et al. 2003).
3 Research on diversity and company performance
The media and opinion makers regularly report that diversity on the board leads to
higher performance (the so-called business case). The studies by consultancy firm
McKinsey (2007) and non-profit organization Catalyst (2007) offer support for this
positive relationship. However, methodological weaknesses fundamentally flaw
both studies. For example, neither study indicates whether or not the differences in
the performance measures are statistically significant and the selection of companies
in the McKinsey report is based on subjective criteria (which will be described more
in detail in the next section).
The results of other (empirical) studies of the relationship between diversity and
business performance are also not consistent. Some studies have found a positive
relationship between diversity and financial performance, while others have found
no relationship or even a negative relationship (Rose 2007; Van Ees et al. 2007). For
example, Krishnan and Park (2005) examined the relationship between diversity and
return on total assets for 679 companies from the Fortune 1,000 data base. The
results showed a positive relationship between diversity in management teams and
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financial performance. Carter et al. (2003) looked at the relationship between
Tobin’s Q and the presence of women in the boards of the Fortune 1,000 companies
and also found a statistically significant positive relationship. On the other hand
Rose (2007) did not find a relationship between board diversity and Tobin’s Q for
Danish listed companies.
It seems that research into the business case is complicated by several factors.
Here we consider three of the most commonly discussed of these: time, causality
and critical mass. Firstly, diversity can be measured as the number of women at a
certain moment in time (a static measure) or as the change in the number of women
on the board (a more dynamic measure) and the consequences of that change (Ryan
and Haslam 2005). In 2003 The Times1 reported that listed companies in the United
Kingdom would probably be better off without women on the board. The author
found a negative relationship between performance and companies at the top of the
English Female FTSE100 Index 2003. Ryan and Haslam (2005) responded by
criticizing the short-sightedness of the article. Ryan and Haslam (2005) investigated
appointments of men and women to the board in relation to financial performance.
They found that the performance of companies that appointed a woman was worse
during the 5 months prior to that appointment than the performance of companies
that appointed a man. They therefore introduced the term ‘‘glass cliff’’ to indicate
that women are sometimes appointed when a company is in trouble. Lee and James
(2003) observed a fall in stock prices after the appointment of a new chief executive
officer (CEO), and this fall was greater after the appointment of a female CEO.
According to Lee and James, an investor associates the appointment of a new CEO
with increased uncertainty, and the uncertainty is even greater when that CEO is
female. Precisely because the board has an influence on strategic decisions (see
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996) the effects cannot be measured in the short term
and this also applies to a changes in the composition of the board.
Secondly, causality and endogeneity may impact conclusions. For example, Van
Ees et al. (2007) argued that a more diverse board could arise in times of poor
company performance. Shareholders are more likely to intervene in the decisions of
top management (i.e. the executive directors) in difficult times, thus increasing
the pressure to have more independent (non-executive) directors. Furthermore, if
shareholders think that the more homogeneous a board is, the less critical it is likely
to be, they may also increase the pressure to have greater diversity in the boardroom
to improve this situation. If, later, researchers investigate the relationship between
company performance and the appointment of independent board members (in this
case: women), a negative rather than positive relationship can be found because the
appointment of women directors followed from the poor performance. Adams and
Ferreira (2009) provided evidence indicating that the presence of female directors
has a positive relationship on board effectiveness, comparable to the impact oft
independent directors. For example, they found that female directors have better
attendance records than male directors, male directors display fewer attendance
problems the more gender-diverse is the board, and women are more likely to join
monitoring committees. However, they also found that the impact of these efforts on
1 Women on board: Help or hindrance? The Times, 11 November (2003).
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performance is positive for companies with previously weak governance, but
negative for companies with an already strong governance structure. They suggest
that this negative effect might be caused by the effect of over-monitoring in those
companies.
Lastly, a complicating factor in investigating the impact of diversity on company
performance comes from critical mass theory. This theory suggests that only when a
certain threshold is reached (a critical mass) the impact of a subgroup (such as
‘women on the board’) becomes more pronounced (Kramer et al. 2006). Kramer
et al. (2006, p. 53) argue that ‘a board with three or more women is more likely to
experience the positive effects and contributions to good governance than a board
with fewer women.’ According to Kanter (1977), being the only one with certain
demographic characteristics can lead to tokenism. Tokens are considered to
represent an entire demographic group (women) and are seen by the dominant group
(men) as a stereotype. The stereotypical female director or supervisor can be
expected to reflect characteristics and opinions of all women, rather than her own
individual characteristics and opinions. Based on critical mass, research into the
relationship between female directors and performance might require a distinction
between boards with one woman and boards that have reached a certain threshold.
Catalyst (2007) and McKinsey (2007) pay little attention to these complicating
factors, nor do they perform statistical tests of the significance of their results.
However, given the popularity of the Catalyst and McKinsey research and their
specific approach in categorising companies’ boards as diverse or non-diverse, for
consistency and for pusposes of comparison we apply their methods to our study of
listed companies in the Netherlands, but with improvements aimed at statistical
weaknesses in their studies. These improvements include statistical significance
tests within the univariate analyses and the addition of a multivariate regression
analysis. The goal of our study is therefore twofold: firstly, to critical evaluate these
two often cited studies and secondly, to investigate the relationship between women
directors and company performance in the Netherlands.
4 The Catalyst (2007) and McKinsey (2007) studies
4.1 The Catalyst (2007) report
Catalyst (2007) examines the relationship between women on corporate boards and
their companies’ financial performance in the United States. Catalyst ranked 520
companies according to the average percentage of women on those companies’
boards in 2001 and 2003 and divided the companies into four quartiles, each
comprising 130 companies. The study compares the financial performance of
companies in the top quartile (those companies with the highest percentage of
women on their boards) with that of the bottom quartile (companies with the lowest
percentage of women on their boards). The financial measures used by Catalyst
were return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS) and return on invested capital
(ROIC). Figure 1 shows the differences in the averages of the financial performance
measures between the firms in the bottom quartile and the top quartile.
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Figure 1 shows that the financial performance of the top quartile is at least 41%
higher (based on ROS) than that of the bottom quartile and is even higher (64%) for
ROIC. Catalyst reported neither on statistical significance regardingthe differences,
nor on whether or not extreme values were taken into account, which would affect
the accuracy of the averages for the two groups of companies. Lee mentioned (in a
footnote) that the correlation between the presence of women on the board and
financial performance does not necessarily imply a causal relationship between
these two variables.
4.2 The McKinsey (2007) report
The McKinsey Report (‘‘Women Matter’’ 2007) consists of two studies (one a
qualitative and the other a quantitative study) of the relationship between women in
top management teams and firm performance. The qualitative investigation was a
large-scale survey of 115,000 employees, inquiring into why companies with women
at the top might perform better than companies with no women in top management
teams. However, media attention focuses mainly on the quantitative investigation in
the report. The McKinsey (2007) study is a collaboration with the Swiss company,
AMM Finance, and its Amazone Euro Fund (AEF). The study compares the 89
European listed companies in the AMM/AEF data base with the best diversity score
(scored by AMM/AEF) against their industry average. Unlike the Catalyst (2007)
investigation, McKinsey (2007) does not compare companies on the basis of the
percentage of women on the board, but rather compares the most gender-diversified
companies against the average of the entire sector. The financial performance of
these companies and the sector in which they operate was measured on the basis of
return on equity (ROE), operating result (earnings before interest and taxes, EBIT)
and stock price growth. The results showed that ROE was 11% higher for the more
diverse companies), EBIT was 91% higher and stock price growth was 36% higher.
4.2.1 Selection of companies?
The McKinsey (2007) report includes the 89 companies in the study in collaboration
with the Amazone Euro Fund, using three criteria for diversity devoped by AEF:
Fig. 1 Results of Catalyst (2007)
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(a) the proportion of female (executive) directors, (b) the presence of more than
two female non-executive directors, and (c) the focus on (‘‘special attention to’’)
diversity in the annual report. However, neither McKinsey (2007) nor AEF defined
‘‘specific attention’’ andthe metrics used to measure this criterion. Moreover, and
most important, the companies in the Amazone Euro Fund are selected not only on
the basis of these diversity criteria, but also on the basis of past performance. The
Amazone Euro Fund flyer states that it uses: ‘‘Firstly a gender diversity scoring
which has been defined under very strict criteria by ourselves, followed by a
financial scoring which allows only the best quality stocks to be selected for the
fund.’’ Given that the McKinsey (2007) results are based on AEF’s selection, which
is made on the basis of performance, a bias necessarily occurs.
McKinsey (2007) then compares the results of the 89 companies with the average
of their sector. However, the results are aggregated for all sectors together. The
McKinsey (2007) report does not indicate which sectors are represented in the group
of 89 companies, whether sectors are equally distributed, or how the companies are
distributed across sectors or countries. Consequently, the information in the report
and the companies concerned are neither verifiable nor is the study replicable. Van
Ees et al. (2007) excluded the McKinsey (2007) report from their discussion of
research into firm performance and gender diversity, because the report does not
specify how the study was set up, which is not in line with the scientific requirement
of reproducibility. Similarly, Wielaard and Nierop (2008) concluded that the hard
evidence that McKinsey provides about the relationship between firm performance
and women in top management is very thin.
5 Methods
5.1 Sample
The sample for our study consists of 116 Dutch companies listed on the Amsterdam
Euronext stock exchange on June 30, 2008. Only companies with a statutory
domicile in the Netherlands are included in the study, because there are large
differences in diversity between countries and using companies with a statutory
domicile in another country could affect the results (Lu¨ckerath-Rovers and Van
Zanten 2008). Listed investment funds are also excluded because of the special
nature and management of these companies. Data of sufficient quality for all 3 years
in the period 2005–2007 was thus available for 99 companies. Of these 99
companies, 68 companies (69%) have no female directors, and 31 companies (31%)
have one or more female directors. Most companies with female directors have only
one woman on the board and most of these are non-executive directors (members of
the supervisory board) For example in 2007 22 of the 31 companies have one female
director, seven have two female directors, one company (TNT) has three female
directors and only one company (Ahold) has four female directors on its board. Only
six female directors (out of 50) are on the executive board. Due to the limited
number of boards with more than one female director testing the critical mass theory
is not useful in the context of The Netherlands. The average percentage of female
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directors for the overall sample of 99 companies is 4.02%, with 12.8% being the
average percentage for the 31 companies with female directors.
5.1.1 Measures
Board diversity For this study three possible measures of board diversity could be
adopted: the Catalyst (2007) method, the McKinsey (2007) method, and a relative
measure.
Catalyst (2007) method In The Netherlands, Catalyst quartile method is not
applicable. The division into four quartiles requires that the quartiles are distinctly
different, and that the average percentage of women directors for companies in the
list increases gradually from 0 to the maximum of 38% (for Ahold). However,
the number of companies in the sample is 99, and 68 of these had no women on the
board during the research period. Since each quartile in The Netherlands contains
around 25 companies, there would be no distinction between the quartiles: both the
first and second quartiles and almost all of the third would have no women on the
board. Consequently, as an alternative to the quartile approach, a dummy measure
of diversity is used for our study for comparison between companies without
women on the board and companies with women on the board during the period
2005–2007.
McKinsey (2007) method The McKinsey (2007) study compared the performance
of 89 companies that scored best on gender score against the average performance of
the sector in which these companies operate. Our study compares the performance of
the most gender-diversified companies (31 companies with female directors) against
the average performance of all companies (and separately for their sector).
Relative diversity measure In addition to the diversity measures described above,
a relative diversity measure is also tested in this study. This measure calculates the
average proportion of female directors on the boards of the sample companies
during the research period (2005–2007). The use of a multi-period average measure
allows better control of changes in diversity, increases reliability and also makes the
analysis more dynamic (Erhardt et al. 2003; Ryan and Haslam 2005).
Performance Our study uses the same performance measures as Catalyst (2007)
and McKinsey (2007). As stated above, the measures used by Catalyst (2007) were
return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS) and return on invested capital
(ROIC), while McKinsey’s (2007) financial performance measures were return on
equity (ROE), operating result (EBIT) and stock price growth. As in the McKinsey
(2007) study we include total shareholder return (TSR) as a financial measure
together with the accounting measures. In addition to stock price growth, TSR
includes the dividends paid, thus providing a more complete picture of the return to
the shareholder.
Control variables Both Catalyst (2007) and McKinsey (2007) compared means,
which involves a univariate analysis, testing one variable at a time. However, they
have not controlled for other variables that might interact with the likelihood of
female directors being appointed. Some variables, such as board size and firm size,
have an impact on this likelihood, if only because of the limited number of seats
available. In our study, OLS regression analysis includes both board size and firm
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size (natural log of total assets) as control variables. It also includes a dummy
variable for companies operating in the financial sector, because companies in that
sector are on average the largest companies but also have the most female directors
(Lu¨ckerath-Rovers and Van Zanten 2008).
5.1.2 Comparison of financial ratios
Both the Catalyst (2007) and McKinsey (2007) studies compare the means of several
financial ratios of companies with or without female directors but, again,they do not
report whether or not the differences are statistically significant. However, even if
these statistical tests were performed, it is questionable whether the comparison of
means is an appropriate test. Whittington (1980) identified two uses of financial
ratios: normative and positive. The normative use is for the measurement of
differences in performance, and the positive use is for the estimation of an empirical
relationship. The normative use enables a conclusion to be drawn as to whether the
financial ratio is high or low compared with the standard. The different statistical
models available for the normative (comparative) or positive (predictive) use of
financial ratios require different statistical properties in the underlying data. The
comparison of means requires that the data have equal intervals, have a normal
distribution and show homogeneity of variance. Since financial ratios often do not
follow a normal distribution (Barnes 1987) and means are affected by extreme
values, our study also applies a median test. Although, the median test is considered
to be less powerful, the comparison will not be influenced by extreme values.
5.1.3 Research limitations
Although, a relationship between the presence of women on the board and firm
performance can be found, it is more difficult to prove a causal relationship.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) note that attention to causality in such research is
important, because company characteristics may also affect the composition of the
board. For example, a retail company may have more female directors than an oil-
and gas company, when considering the gender of employees and customers. More
female employees at all levels of a company will probably lead to more women at
senior positions, and ultimately, on the board. A company with more female
customers may have more incentives to communicate and link effectively with these
customers by means of also female employees at all levels (as also suggested by
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) in the Resource Dependency Theory) Moreover, as
discussed before, previous studies show that investors do not always respond
positively to the appointment of a woman (see Lee and James 2003; Ryan and
Haslam 2005; Van Ees et al. 2007).
6 Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all companies in the sample and also the
differences in means and medians between companies with and without female
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directors. During the period 2005–2007, 31% of the 99 companies had one or more
women on the board, and on average 4% of the directors were women. This is the
weighted average of 2% female executive directors and 8% female non-executive
directors. The average total board (combined executive board and supervisory
board) had 7.8 board members: 10.0 for companies with female directors and 6.3 for
companies without female directors. The difference in board size is significant
(t = 5.4). Firm size is significantly larger for companies with female directors
(t = 4.4). Table 1 also shows the differences in means and medians for financial
performance. The comparison of means is similar to the Catalyst (2007) approach,
and is discussed in the next section.
6.1 Catalyst (2007) method
Figure 2 shows the averages of return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS) and
return on invested capital (ROIC) for the two groups of companies (with and
without female directors). (Figure 2 is derived from Table 2, but displays the
information in the same way as the Catalyst (2007) report (see Fig. 1) for ease of
comparison).
Using the same variables as used by Catalyst (2007) shows that companies with
women directors score, on average, better than companies without women directors.
The difference is greatest for ROE: companies with women directors have an average
ROE of 23.3% while companies without women directors have an ROE of only
11.1%, which is a significant difference of 110% (t = 4.0). The ROS and ROIC for
companies with women directors are, respectively, 17% (t = 1.2) and 54% (t = 2.3)
higher than for companies without women directors. The difference in ROIC is
significant. Comparison of medians shows similar results although, the difference in
ROIC using this measure is no longer significant. Surprisingly the comparison of the
means and medians for TSR shows a negative relationship and, while not significant,
represents a counter-intuitive result. Moreover, stockprice growth shows a positive
(but not significant) relationship, yet paid-out dividends is the only difference from
TSR. This couldimply that companies with female directors pay-out relatively lower
dividends than companies without female directors. However, determining reasons
for this difference would require further research.
Fig. 2 Lee et al. method for 99 Dutch listed companies
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6.2 McKinsey (2007) method
Using the McKinsey (2007) approach, the differences between the companies with
female directors and the overall average of all companies are shown in Fig. 3.
For the first three performance measures (as used in the McKinsey (2007)
approach—which does not compare companies with and without female directors
but rather investigates whether companies with female directors perform above the
average of all companies) the companies with female directors do indeed perform
above the average: ROE is 56% higher than the average for the overall sample,
EBIT is 17% higher and stock price growth is 8% higher. However, for the
additional financial measure, TSR, the result is slightly lower (-9%) for the
companies with female directors. The analyses by sector (not shown) display a
similar picture. The t test is not applicable for this comparison. However, on the
basis of the correlation coefficients (see Table 2) only the correlation between ROE
and the presence of female directors is positive and significant (P \ 0.01).
The correlation coefficients also show that the probability of the presence of a
woman on the board increases with firm size and board size. Both the presence of a
woman on the board (dummy variable) and the percentage of women on the board
are significantly and positively correlated with ROE. As with the comparison of
means in the previous section, the correlation with TSR is negative but not
significant. There is no multi-collinearity between the variables.
6.3 Regression analysis
In addition to the Catalyst (2007) and McKinsey (2007) methods, this study also
uses a regression analysis to further explore the relationship between ROE and the
presence of female directors. Table 3 shows the regression analysis with ROE as the
dependent variable (models 1–3). Model 1 is the control model, including firm size,
board size and a dummy variable for financial companies. In all three models, ROE
relates positively to the size of the company and negatively to financial sector.
Fig. 3 McKinsey method for 99 Dutch listed companies
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The results in Model 2 show that the presence of one or more female directors on
the board relates positively and significantly (t = 3.2) to ROE. The adjusted R2
increases from 0.18 in Model 1–0.25 in Model 2. The results in Model 3 show that
the relative presence of women on the board is related positively and significantly
(t = 2.5) with ROE, and the adjusted R2 increases to 0.22.
A striking result that follows from this study is that higher return on equity is
consistently and statistically significantly for companies with women on the board
than for companies without women on the board. The regression analysis also shows
the presence of women to be a significant variable in relation to ROE. Both results
suggest that on average the presence of women on the board is a distinctive feature
of companies that perform better. However, the other variables do not show a
significant relationship, and for TSR the relationship is negative. However, this
study does not suggest that there is causality and would therefore be premature to
use this positive relationship as an argument for appointing women to a board.
7 Conclusion
Recent literature assumes that a more diverse board leads to better quality decision-
making, as the board is more independent and takes account of more perspectives.
However, the impact on the decisions made and subsequently on financial
performance is difficult to measure because many factors affect the performance of
a company. Causality and cross-linkage between diversity and other performance-
influencing factors make single factor research problematic.
Nevertheless, as with the McKinsey (2007) and Catalyst (2007) studies higher
ROE in our study is consistently and statistically significant for companies with
female directors compared to companies without female directors. However, in The
Netherlands the majority of female directors are non-executive directors who are
Table 3 Results of regression analysis for predicting ROE
Dependent variable ROE
Independent variables Model 1: control
model
Model 2: Diversity
dummy
Model 3: relative
diversity
Constant -33.2 (-2.8)** -30.4 (-2.7)** -31.70 (-2.8)**
Total assets (log) 25.3 (3.2)** 25.0 (3.3)** 24.7 (3.2)**
Board size -0.4 (-0.5) -1.1 (-1.4) -0.7 (-0.9)
Financial sector dummy -15.1 (-3.0)** -15.2 (-3.2)** -13.8 (-2.8)**
Female directors (dummy) 10.2 (3.2)**
Female directors (%) 50.6 (2.5)*
F statistic 7.938*** 9.008*** 7.888***
Adjusted R2 0.175 0.246 0.219
** P \ 0.01; *** P \ 0.001
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often the only woman in the boardroom. Furthermore, not all performance measures
in our study show a significant positive relationship with the presence of women in
the board. From these findings it cannot be conclude definitely that one woman on
the board impacts the performance of the company on her own. Along with previous
empirical studies, our results may ad support to the idea that having women on the
board is a logical consequence of a more innovative, modern, and transparent
enterprise where all levels of the company achieve high performance (a.o. Singh and
Vinnicombe 2004). The results may also support the notion that companies with
women on their boards have a better connection with the relevant stakeholders at all
levels of the company, which also improves the company’s reputation. This follows
from the resource dependency theory, which theory describes the board of directors
also serves as a linkage mechanism towards all relevant stakeholders. (see Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978; Hillman et al. 2007). Also (female) employees at companies
with women on their boards are more motivated to excel because they all see that
they can reach the top (Rose 2007). Companies with women on the their board
could be more successful because people are promoted on the basis of their
capabilities and not on the basis of demographic characteristics (Krishnan and Park
2005) and the companies are more successful in making use of the whole talent pool
for competent directors instead of only half of the talent pool. More research is
required, however, to discover the reasons behind the better ROE performance and
the other elements conjectured above of these specific companies. Other i questions
worthy of further investigation include whether or not the women on the board have
different management or supervisory styles from their male colleagues on the board,
whether or not companies with more women on their boards are also more
diversified at other levels, and why the shareholder return does not relate positively
to diversity. Results of such may help to shed more light on the cause and effect
relationship between diversity and firm performance.
From our study, three furtherr issues are highlighted. Firstly, while this study is
based on the percentages of female directors at year-ended 2007, it is worth
investigating whether the goal included in the Dutch Corporate Governance
Codefrom 2009, to ‘aim for a diverse composition in terms of gender’ has resulted
in an increase in the representation of female directors. If so, then other countries
might also consider including a similar goal in their Corporate Governance Code. If
no substantial progress is made as a result of this measure in the Dutch context, then
other more affirmative actions comparable with those taken by Spain or Norway
could be considered. Secondly, as mentioned before, the relevant interval before or
after the appointment of a woman on the board and the existence of a potential
threshold (critical mass) needs to be considered in seeking evidence for building the
business case for more women on boards. Finally, the contradiction in the results
regarding the relationship between female representation on the board and both
stockprice growth and total shareholder return needs further investigation. While the
only difference between the results for these two measures is paid-out dividends,
this may indicate a difference in attitude between male and female directors towards
the shareholders’ and the company’s interests.
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